Notwithstanding the observed positive correlations between critics' quality ratings and wine prices, the range of these correlations is quite high. In light of this, researchers must consider the factors that either strengthen or weaken the association between quality ratings and prices. In this paper, we propose that the slope of the relationship between quality ratings and wine prices is moderated by the amount of attention that producers receive. Because attention increases with a producer's critical exposure (i.e., its history of critical coverage), price-quality relationships will be steeper for producers with more critical exposure. This prediction is confirmed in an analysis of New World wines selling into the U.S. market over the 1987 to 2001 period. While a wine's price is a positive function of its own quality rating, the strength of the price-quality relationship increases with a producer's critical exposure (JEL classifications: L11, L13, L15).
I. Introduction
In the wine industry, quality ratings are provided by (among others) the Wine Spectator, the Wine Advocate and the Wine Enthusiast. Because quality matters to consumers and because the opinions of these experts are deemed credible, a wine's price should be a positive function of how well it is rated by the critics. In their study of price-quality relationships in a sample of Bordeaux wines, Landon and Smith (1997) find a positive relationship between the quality ratings reported in the Wine Spectator and wine prices. A similar result is obtained by Benjamin and Podolny (1999) in their study of California wines (using quality ratings from the Connoisseur's Guide) and by Schamel and Anderson (2003) in their study of wines from Australia and New Zealand (using quality ratings from James Halliday and Winestate).
These analyses all suggest a strong and unwavering relationship between published quality ratings and product prices. However, using data from Consumer Reports covering 1,271 different product markets, Tellis and Wernerfelt (1987) show that despite the positive correlation between quality ratings and prices, the range of these correlations is very high. A similar observation has been made in the wine industry where Jones and Storchmann (2001) conclude that "it is clear that there are great differences between particular chateaux in respect to Parker-point elasticities of the prices." In light of this, it is troubling that existing research has not considered factors that either strengthen or weaken the observed association between quality ratings and wine prices.
One such factor is attention. As Arrow (1974) noted, "each individual economic agent is assumed to start with the ability to receive some signals from the natural and social environment. This capacity is not, however, unlimited, and the scarcity of information-handling ability is an essential feature for understanding ... behavior." We follow Arrow and propose that the strength of the association between a wine's price and its quality rating will depend on the extent to which individuals are paying attention to the product and its rating. A quality rating is a very precise and highly relevant quality indicator because the information that it contains is maximally relevant to the focal product. However, it also lacks salience at low levels of attention; individuals who are not paying close attention will likely miss it.
Consider three variables that are in play when a producer sets the list price for its wine: its underlying quality, the expected likelihood that critics will notice and evaluate the product (P 1 ), and the expected likelihood that consumers will internalize that quality rating once it is published (P 2 ). We propose that list prices will be set as a function of product quality weighted by P 1 and P 2 . 1 When P 1 and P 2 are thought to be very small, a producer is forced to price its products toward the center of the quality distribution; e.g., toward 'typical' producer quality. Even though the producer knows the product's specific quality, it is not confident that this information will effectively reach the market. As P 1 and P 2 increase, the producer increasingly prices its product in a way that is sensitive to its underlying quality in the belief that critics will publish a quality rating which will then be noticed and internalized by consumers. As consumers gain access to the product-specific quality information, they come to weigh it more heavily (see Figure 1 ).
Assuming they value product quality, information about higher quality increases demand and translates into a higher price. For lower quality products, greater accessibility reveals negative information, which reduces demand and lowers price.
1 Note that our theorizing relies on the assumption that producers have a good idea about product quality when they set their list prices, and that there is a correspondence between their own and the critics' assessments of quality. In respect of these assumptions, we interviewed several of the major distributors responsible for importing New World wines into the U.S. market. Each confirmed that expert tasting and evaluation are part of the portfolio of activities offered, and that they have a very good idea of a wine's quality before they assist a producer in setting its list price. To confirm that experienced wine tasters tend to reach similar conclusions about quality, we examined the quality ratings of a random sample of 100 wines evaluated by both the Wine Spectator and the Wine Advocate in 2001 (both publications rate wines on a 100-point scale). For 83 percent of the wines, the critics publish ratings that are within three points of one another.
This leaves the question of what influences the two probabilities, P 1 and P 2 . Random events may direct attention toward a given producer or group of producers. For example, the Judgment of Paris, which was staged in France in 1976, directed the attention of the world's wine consumers toward U.S. producers and their wines (Taber, 2005) . Or, endorsements by, or affiliations with prominent others may attract the attention of potential consumers (Podolny, 1993) . A producer's own promotion or advertising initiatives may also attract attention to its products (Hoch and Ha, 1986; Vakratsas and Ambler, 1999) . Although accidents, affiliations and strategic actions may influence market attention, we focus on the process whereby attention accumulates as a function of a producer's history of critical coverage.
In addition to providing information about quality, the appearance of a critical review directs the attention of market participants toward certain producers and their products. Zuckerman (1999; shows that the distribution of legitimacy across firms is influenced by the coverage decisions made by investment analysts. Firms that attract the right kind of coverage are more likely to make it into investors' consideration sets. In his analysis of theater critics at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe, Shrum (1991; 1996) shows that irrespective of the quality of the reviews, simply being reviewed increased the probability that an act will be noticed by potential audience members. Similarly, Ravid (1999) finds that the number of critical reviews is a stronger predictor of film revenues than the actual content of those reviews. We extend these analyses and argue that critics channel attention within wine markets by providing certain producers with more critical coverage Figure 1 Price-Quality Relationship as Attention Increases over longer periods of time. Two different aspects of this history of critical coverage may influence attention patterns. Attention may accumulate with the number of prior reviews. At the same time, the longer a producer has received critical coverage, the more time consumers have to become familiar with it and its products. In either case, a producer's history of critical coverage enhances the extent to which critics and consumers attend to its products. It increases the likelihood that critics will publish quality ratings for its current product (P 1 ), and it increases probability that consumers will observe and internalize that ratings once published (P 2 ). Each of these effects will make a product's list price more sensitive to its underlying quality (see Figure 1) . Thus, we predict that the positive impact of a product's quality rating on its price increases with its producer's critical exposure (i.e., its history of critical coverage).
The above studies of price-quality relationships in the wine industry look beyond the quality rating of a focal wine to consider its producer's past quality demonstrations. In the spirit of Shapiro's (1983) model of reputation formation, these demonstrations should translate into a reputation for product quality that is reflected in current prices. Landon and Smith (1997) and Benjamin and Podolny (1999) both find that a producer's previous quality ratings have this predicted impact on the prices of its current product offerings. We continue our examination of the moderating role of attention by asking whether accumulating critical coverage influences the relationship between wine prices and this more indirect indicator of product quality.
A simple extension of our attention story might suggest that as a producer's critical coverage accumulates, consumers place more weight on all of its quality indicators. This would yield a positive moderating effect of critical coverage on the price-reputation relationship. However, we must consider the reputation effect in the context of the specific characteristics of the reputation indicator and of the implications of our first prediction. Because a producer's reputation for quality is an amalgamation of its past quality demonstrations, it offers indirect information about the focal product. At the same time, because it is derived from a larger number of quality demonstrations, it is more accessible when less attentive consumers are unwilling to gather more relevant information. In their analysis of producer reputations and wine prices, Landon and Smith (1997) propose that consumers will make greater use of reputation information when they have difficulty gathering more specific information about product quality. Applying this idea to our theorizing about attention, we expect producer reputation to have its strongest effect when critical exposure is lowest because consumers are not paying attention to and therefore gathering the more relevant product quality ratings. As producers attract more critical coverage, consumers tend to access and make use of the quality ratings. While this increases the impact of these ratings on price, it simultaneously reduces the need for the indirect information housed in the reputation indicator. As one gains access to information about the quality of a particular product, the more indirect information housed in the producer's reputation becomes less relevant. We therefore predict that as critical coverage accumulates the positive impact of a producer's reputation for quality on the price of its wines decreases with its producer's critical exposure.
Note how this reputation effect is consistent with existing literature on signaling. In their model, Bagwell and Riordan (1991) conclude that if consumers lack information about quality, then a high quality product may signal its true type by initially pricing above the equilibrium level. As consumers become more informed about quality, prices tend to fall toward expected long run levels. Our framework suggests that a similar dynamic operates at the producer level. If consumers are not paying sufficient attention to evaluate quality differences across products, then charging a premium for its reputation for quality may signal the true 'type' of a high quality producer. As attention increases, consumers become better informed about specific products, and give less weight to producer level indicators. Therefore, the price premium attributable to a producer's reputation for quality should fall.
II. Data and Analysis
The data that we analyze come from the Wine Spectator and cover quality ratings of New World wines published during the 1987 to 2001 period. 2 'New World' is a shorthand expression for a cohort of seven wine-producing countries that are not among the traditional European producers: these being Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, South Africa, Canada and Israel (Allen et al., 1998; Arkell, 1999) . In 1987, the volume of wine exported from these New World countries amounted to less than 1.5 percent of that exported from the four largest Old Word wine countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain). By 2001, the situation had changed dramatically -exports from New World wine countries were almost 25 percent of Old World country export levels. 3 This dramatic ascendance offers an opportunity to examine the relationship between product quality and price in a context wherein a key class of producers were emerging on the world scene.
Because wine is an experience good (Nelson, 1970) , the quality of a bottle of wine is not directly observable in advance of purchase. Here, a bottle of wine refers to a specific producer-wine-year combination; e.g., Rosemount Estates (producer) Mudgee Hill of Gold Shiraz (wine), 1999 vintage (year). Moreover, despite the best efforts of producers, fluctuations in many different factors lead to irreducible variability in quality across bottles of wine -both within a given year and over time. Consider that Rosemount Estates received Wine Spectator reviews for 23 of the wines that it released in 2001. These quality ratings ranged from 79 out of 100 (roughly 1.25 standard deviations below the average quality rating in our sample) to 92 (roughly 1.75 standard deviation above that average). This variability in quality in 2001 persists despite the fact that Rosemount Estates received 206 reviews between 1987 and 2000 -the maximum received by any of our sampled producers.
2 Although other publications provide assessments of New World wines, their coverage of non-U.S. wines is more limited. In 2001, the Wine Spectator published roughly 1,500 quality ratings from our seven New World countries, while the Wine Advocate and the Wine Enthusiast published fewer than 600 each. Moreover, "the Spectator ... reaches an audience over six times larger than the Advocate's (Anonymous, 1999) ." 3 Export data are from the FAO Statistical Database, UN Food & Agricultural Organization, Rome, 2001. In this context, the opinions of wine critics clearly matter and posted prices tend to reflect their quality ratings. At the same time, the very large number of products and producers means that securing a visible place in the market is problematic (Lecocq and Visser, 2006) . The Wine Spectator conducted roughly 9,000 evaluations of New World wines between 1987 and 2001. This number is itself very high, but it pales in comparison to the almost 57,000 evaluations of wines originating in France, Italy, Germany and Spain, and the more than 33,000 evaluations of U.S. wines. This suggests that New World wine producers struggled to get their products noticed.
We obtain our price variable by dividing the list price reported in the Wine Spectator by the U.S. consumer price index (normalized to unity in 1987). Because the distribution of real wine prices is highly skewed, we employ the log of real price as the dependent variable. The quality ratings are those reported (on a 100 point scale) in the Wine Spectator. These ratings come from blind tastings by wine experts, and the process ensures that tasters do not know who made the wine or its list price when they assign their quality ratings. We are therefore confident that they are not spuriously influenced by the producers' reputations or by the wines' suggested list prices. A producer's reputation for quality is the average quality rating of all other wines made by the same producer in the focal year or in one of the two preceding years (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999) . 4 Because of the relatively recent and dramatic rise of New World wine producers on global markets, there is considerable variability in critical exposure levels during our sample period. Only a handful of New World producers (e.g., Penfolds from Australia) were attracting critical attention in the early 1980s (Allen et al., 1998) . As New World producers began to attract more attention throughout the 1980s and 1990s, they did so at different times and at different rates. Figure 2 demonstrates the variability across New World producers in the years in which they first received Wine Spectator reviews in the U.S. market. Overall, the products in our sample include those from producers who never before received a single review through those whose producers had garnered more than 200 prior critical reviews. This variance allows us to test whether the producers' different histories of critical exposure influenced the extent to which their product quality ratings and their reputations are reflected in the prices they charge.
Our critical exposure variable is the count of prior reviews received by the focal producer up to year t − 1, divided by 10. Although we employ this count-based measure in the models that we report, we ran additional models using a variable that reflects a producer's duration of critical coverage. This clock variable dates from the first year in which a producer receives a review. The two exposure variables are highly correlated (p = 0.70) and yield virtually identical results. Finally, the tests of our hypotheses require a set of interactions between the quality rating and producer reputation variables and the critical exposure variable. Given concerns about multicollinearity, we mean-centered each variable before creating each interaction term.
The models also include a set of indicator variables for each country, for each grape varietal, and for each year within the sample period. Because the wines in our sample are produced in different countries, exchange rate fluctuations may affect the prices charged in the U.S. In particular, local currency appreciations relative to the U.S. dollar should be associated with higher local production costs (measured in U.S. dollars) and therefore higher U.S. prices. We control for this possibility with a variable that accounts for the percentage change (relative to 1987) of the value of each country's currency relative to the U.S. dollar. Three additional variables account for the extent of competition within each varietal category. One variable counts the number of U.S.-produced wines (divided by 1,000) rated by the Wine Spectator in each varietal category in each year. Consistent with ecological models of competition (Hannan and Carroll, 1992) , we include the square of this variable to account for possible non-monotonic effects. Because competition may also be quality-based, we include a third variable that measures the average quality rating received by the U.S.-produced wines in the different varietal categories in each year.
Our theorizing relies on the fact that producers and distributors have a reasonably good idea about product quality (see the discussion surrounding Figure 1 ), which produces a strong correspondence between their own and the critics' assessments of product quality. This begs the question of whether producers tend to become better over time in predicting the reactions of critics to their wines. This is an important issue because if improvements in the ability to accurately assess product quality correlates with accumulating critical exposure, then the interpretation of our results would be suspect. We deal with this issue by 1984 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 controlling for total producer experience. Here, we consulted numerous sources to compile information on the founding dates of 503 wine producers in our sample who are responsible for roughly 84 percent of the observations. 5 To determine the extent to which producer learning has an impact on the sensitivity of price to quality, we include the producer age variable and its interaction with the quality variables in all of the models that we report.
We also control for the age of each wine at release, because wines that have been aged longer tend to command higher prices. In addition, because wines are produced in different quantities, price-quantity trade-offs may affect our results (Haeger and Storchmann, 2006) . The Wine Spectator reports quantity data (i.e., the total number of cases produced) for 47 percent of the observations in our sample. We use the log of the number of cases produced (divided by 1,000) as a proxy for the quantity available for sale in the U.S. Finally, each model also includes an interaction between the product quality and producer reputation variables because prior research documents that returns to quality demonstrations are higher for producers with reputations for producing high quality products (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Jones and Storchmann, 2001 ).
The Wine Spectator evaluated 9,217 New World wines during the 1987 to 2001 period. However, we exclude several observations due to missing price data, leaving 8,892 observations. Descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations for all variables are reported in Table 1 (see Appendix A for definitions of each variable). The average of the log of the real price variable corresponds to a real price of $9.47. The averages of the quality rating and producer reputation variables are 84.302 and 84.209. Finally, the number of prior critical evaluations for the average producer is roughly sixteen.
The observations in our sample are not independent -there can be multiple observations for each producer in each year. We therefore estimate regression models with robust standard errors clustered around producers. Robust standard error estimators provide asymptotically consistent estimates of the variance without making assumptions about the distribution of the errors in our equations.
III. Results
Our results are reported in Table 2 . Model 1 includes the control variables and the quality and reputation variables. The count-based competition variables are both significant and in the expected directions. As the number of U.S. wines of the same varietal type increases, price increases and then decreases. The inflection point for this relationship occurs when the count of U.S. wines on offer is roughly 932, which is roughly two standard deviations above the average for this variable. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect of producer age on price is negative and significant. This may reflect the fact we are studying New World producers. Because the New World wine boom is a relatively recent phenomenon, the 
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U.S. market may favor producers founded during the 1980s and 1990s. As expected, a wine's price increases significantly with its own age while the quantity of a wine that is produced has a negative effect on price. The significant coefficient also confirms that wines with higher quality ratings do command higher prices. The producer reputation effect is also positive and significant while the relationship between price and quality increases with producer reputation. Consumers do tend to pay more for quality demonstrations from producers with reputations for high product quality. Finally, note that the null coefficient on the interaction between the quality and producer age variables suggests that producers do not become better at predicting or pricing to product quality as they gain experience.
When we add the critical exposure variable in Model 2, its effect is negative and significant. By itself, increased critical exposure imposes a penalty, perhaps in the form of reduced exclusivity. Producers that have produced many different wines in the past may lack the cachet of the boutique wine producer. This said, the interaction between a wine's quality rating and its producer's critical exposure level is positive and significant coefficient, supporting our first prediction. A calculation using the coefficients from Model 2 reveals that the change in the log of real price associated with a unit change in quality increases from 0.031 when critical exposure equals zero, to 0.133 when a producer reaches the maximum critical exposure level. This suggests that at the mean of the price variable a unit increase in quality raises the price of a bottle of wine from a zero exposure producer from $9.49 to $9.78. The same increase in quality for the highest exposure producer increases price from $9.49 to $10.84. This latter increase is between four and five times as large. Finally, Model 2 also analyzes the effect of increasing critical exposure on the relationship between producer reputation and price. The significant negative interaction effect supports our second prediction. Increasing critical exposure dampens the impact of the more indirect producer reputation variable while stimulating the effect of the product's quality rating.
Taken together, these results suggest that wine prices do reflect the information housed in the different quality indicators. It is a question of which indicators tend to have more impact at different levels of critical exposure. Less attentive consumers do not devote as much effort accessing and processing product quality ratings and therefore rely more heavily on a producer's reputation. Viewing the negative interaction between critical exposure and producer reputation in the context of the positive interaction with the product quality rating, we see that this rating comes to substitute for the more indirect reputation indicator as exposure accumulates. However, note that the negative coefficient on the producer reputation interaction (−0.002) offsets but does not exceed the positive coefficient on the quality rating interaction (0.005). Although consumers are placing less weight on producer reputation, there is evidence of increased overall attention to a producer's quality indicators as critical exposure increases.
A potential concern with this analysis relates to its exclusive reliance on the Wine Spectator for the quality ratings and for the information used to generate the critical exposure variable. In our theorizing, we assume that critical exposure in general influences the amount of attention paid to the different New World wine producers within the U.S. market. To check this assumption, we searched back issues of the Wine Advocate and recorded the first year in which each producer received a published rating from Robert Parker -another highly influential wine critic. We then created an indicator variable set to one in those years after the producer was 'discovered' by Robert Parker, and an interaction between this indicator variable and the product's Wine Spectator rating and reputation. As indicated in Model 2a, there is a positive main effect associated with the post-Robert Parker variable, as well as a positive and significant interaction between it and the published quality rating. This latter result suggests that the critical attention offered by Robert Parker intensifies the relationship between a wine's list price and the quality rating it receives from a different set of wine critics. The reputation interaction is again negative (although this time not statistically significant).
IV. Conclusion
For a quality rating to influence a wine's price, it must be noticed (Olshavsky, 1994) . Therefore, the relationship between quality ratings and wine prices should be moderated by the amount of attention a producer receives. We have argued that the amount of attention paid to a producer increases with its critical exposure or its history of critical coverage. As this accumulates, the information that is housed in the wine quality ratings is given more weight. This reduces the need for the more indirect information housed in the more indirect reputation indicator, which is thereby given less weight. Our analysis of pricequality relationships in the wine industry supports the predictions that follow from our attention-based theory. A wine's price is a positive function of its own quality rating and of its producer's reputation for product quality. However, the strength of the price-quality relationship increases with a producer's critical exposure while the impact of producer reputation on price declines.
These results attest to the dual influence of wine critics. On the one hand, the quality information that they generate can be an important determinant of price. On the other hand, their actions over time channel the attention of the market toward some producers over others. In terms of research into quality signals and prices, this insight highlights a fundamental difference between the information content of a quality indicator and the mechanisms through which it has its impact. In this light, it is tempting to view the critical exposure variable as a quality indicator in and of itself. Risk-averse consumers should prefer products made by producers with legitimate track records. However, our results suggest that the more important impact of critical exposure is to make a product's own quality ratings more impactful. In other words, the information that wine consumers seek resides in the quality indicators, while the associations with prior reviews serve to develop access channels to those indicators.
Finally, we stress that this research should be complemented by additional work that considers other drivers of attention. A producer's critical exposure is but one of the factors that influence the amount of attention paid to it and its wines. Others include random events, advertising and promotional expenditures, and inter-organizational affiliations. While our results provide support for meaningful differences in the amount of attention paid to newer versus more established producers, much additional work is needed to fully articulate the process whereby differential attention levels accumulate within and therefore influence markets.
